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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Director, Office of Legislative Liaison


OLL 85-3590  
18 November 1985

NOTE FOR: ADCI

SUBJECT: Gary Schmitt Phone Call


At 1645 hours on this date, Gary Schmitt, Executive Director of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, called to say that the DCI's open letter reference to the Kissinger Study on arms control has led to \* requests for that study.

Schmitt wants to be assured that CIA does not release that very sensitive study. We assured him.

  
Charles A. Briggs

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\* which is classified and sensitive. Tronic?

0 - ADCI  
① - EXDIR  
1 - ER  
1 - DDI  
1 - O/D/OLL Sensitive File  
1 - C/Liaison Division/OLL  
1 - OLL Subject  
1 - OLL Chron  
DD/OLL:  (18 Nov 1985)

STAT



ER:

This is the Kissinger letter the courier handcarried this evening for your files.

18 October

STAT

*(Atts. are for your background;  
did not go to Dr. K.)*

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Register

85- 3956

17 October 1985


NOTE FOR: NIO for Strategic Programs

FROM: DCI

Larry:

Henry Kissinger gave me this draft of his report to the PFIAB. He said he wouldn't send it without my approval and asked for suggestions. Do you have any suggestions? Fritz Ermarth's are attached.

Get this back to me as soon as you can. I'd like to send it back to Henry this week.

  
William J. Casey

Attachment

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

86-3956/2

18 October 1985

Dear Henry,

All of us like your draft statement of views which you gave to me at breakfast recently, with a few corrections.

We think the statement on the first page under strategic offensive capabilities which describes the hard naval facilities is not entirely accurate because, first, they are not complete (you'd have to say "are building" instead of "built") and they wouldn't survive a nuclear strike.

Under strategic defensive capabilities, there might be added the massive effort which they have been making since the 1950s to protect the military and civilian leadership.

The important thing the document would do would be to expose the President to the idea that better, available understanding of Soviet military doctrine and behavior can not only improve our arms control policies, it can raise the efficiency/effectiveness of defense. This could thereby harmonize well with needed defense reforms. The Administration must get on this bandwagon before anti-defense factions seize control of it.

Yours,

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William J. Casey

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger  
Suite 1021  
1800 K Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20006

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SECRET

B-204

Mr. Casey:

Basically this is a constructive letter, despite

- some exaggeration of what we can do for US planning with the kind of analysis he recommends
- the somewhat disingenuous claim "if only I had known." (Some of my friends lost their jobs and I spent a lot of last years trying to get through his palace guard with this message 1972-1975)

But we should not despise the convert.

The most important proposal is <sup>A</sup>to expose the President to the idea that better, available understanding of Soviet military doctrine and behavior can not only improve our arms control policies, it can raise the efficiency/effectiveness of defense. <sup>This could</sup>

It can thereby harmonize well with needed defense reforms. The Administration must get on this bandwagon before anti-defense factions seize control of it.

Phil

P.S. I think the <sup>other</sup> experts (Gershwin, Odom, Marshall, Gordon Myers) would basically agree with this letter. You might ask Larry G. to give it another "snake check."

85- 3956/1

18 October 1985

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Lawrence K. Gershwin  
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

1. I basically agree with the thrust of Kissinger's memo. Doing the Soviet-style analysis along the lines of what he suggested, however, while worthwhile, will, in my view, not have a significant effect on US policies. One reason is the lack of enough highly capable people in the Intelligence Community and in DOD who can be spared for this work, given the other demands on their talents. Another is the usual reluctance of policy people--particularly in Congress--to make use of analysis of Soviet perspectives. [redacted]

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2. On the other hand, I think we have a relatively poor record of trying to accomplish Soviet-style analysis in the strategic forces and global conflict areas--Andy Marshall has been hammering on this for 15 years. [redacted]

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3. We have done well in some general purpose force analyses, but these had the benefit of a rich set of specific evidence materials. I think we can and should do better on Soviet-style analysis, but it will be tough to do this within the existing organizational structure and manpower effort. One way would be to contract for help in some areas, although contractors cannot use some of our best and most sensitive materials. [redacted]

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4. I should note that Andy Marshall has developed an impressive capability at the Rand Corporation to do strategic analysis, and the Intelligence Community has not yet become seriously involved. This effort, if properly exploited, could be helpful in working Kissinger's suggestion, but again, it will take the talents of some key people who are already heavily committed. [redacted]

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*Larry*

Lawrence K. Gershwin

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